CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-FIRST
AMENDMENT-OBSCENITY
TEST REQUIRES TRIER OF FACT TO DETERMINE WHETHER
"REASONABLE PERSON" WOULD FIND MATERIAL LACKS SERIOUS VALUE AND ERRONEOUS JURY INSTRUCTION CONCERNING
OBSCENITY STANDARD IS SUBJECT TO HARMLESS ERROR ANAL-

YsIs-Pope v. Illinois, 107 S. Ct. 1918 (1987).
The first amendment explicitly guarantees freedom of expression.' Despite this guarantee, all forms of expression are not
constitutionally protected. 2 Obscenity has often been recognized
as a category of expression that is outside the safe confines of the
first amendment. Although a majority of the Justices of the
United States Supreme Court agree that obscenity is not protected by the first amendment, 4 the law of obscenity has traveled
a meandering path.5 This path has led to the United States
I See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment provides in pertinent part:
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press
.... Id. The first amendment protection of freedom of expression applies to the
states through the fourteenth amendment. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
666 (1925).
2 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). The
Supreme Court recognized that certain types of speech do not merit constitutional
protection since they are not an "essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are
of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." Id. at
572 (footnote omitted).
3 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957). The Roth Court stated:
"We hold that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech
or press." Id. See also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982) (child pornography not protected by first amendment); Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S.
49, 66 (1973) (constitutional doctrine of privacy does not extend to a person's right
to watch obscene movies in public places); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 572 (1942) (lewd and obscene speech not protected by first amendment). See
generally Scanlon, Freedom of Expression and Categoriesof Expression, 40 U. PIrr. L. REV.
519 (1979); Schauer, Categoriesand the FirstAmendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND.
L. REV. 265 (1981); Schauer, Speech and "Speech "--Obscenity and "Obscenity ".An Exercise in the Interpretation of ConstitutionalLanguage, 67 GEO. L. J. 899 (1979).
4 See, e.g.,
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476 (1957). Only two Justices, Douglas and Black, have taken the view that
obscene expression is protected by the first amendment. Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629, 705 (1968) (Harlan, J. concurring).
5 See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). Justice Harlan commented that "[t]he subject of obscenity has produced a variety of views among the
members of the Court unmatched in any other course of constitutional adjudication." Id. at 704-05 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.
184, 197 (1964) (Stewart,J., concurring) ("It is possible to read the.., in a variety
of ways."). A two year study by the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography
also highlights the difficulties and uncertainties related to the laws of obscenity. See
COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OB-
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Supreme Court's recent decision, Pope v. Illinois,6 which addressed the standard by which a material's "literary, artistic,
political, or scientific" value is to be judged.2 Additionally, the
Court considered whether an erroneous jury instruction pertaining to the appropriate obscenity standard is subject to harmless
error analysis.8
Richard Pope and Charles Morrison, petitioners, were both
employed as part-time attendants at separate adult bookstores located in Rockford, Illinois. 9 Both adult bookstores had large
signs outside advertising the nature of their business' 0 and notifying minors that they were prohibited from entering the
stores." Both stores offered for sale a variety of magazines
which depicted explicit sexual activities. 12
On July 21, 1983, Rockford, Illinois detectives entered the
bookstores where the petitioners were employed and purchased
several magazines from the petitioners. 13 Shortly thereafter,
SCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY

53 (Comm. Print 1970) [hereinafter

COMMISSION ON

OBSCENITY].

Society's attempts to legislate for adults in the area of obscenity
have not been successful. Present laws prohibiting the consensual sale
or distribution of explicit sexual materials to adults are extremely unsatisfactory in their practical application. The Constitution permits material to be deemed "obscene" for adults only if, as a whole, it appeals to
the "prurient" interest of the average person, is "patently offensive" in
light of "community standards," and lacks "redeeming social value."
These vague and highly subjective aesthetic, psychological and moral
tests do not provide meaningful guidance for law enforcement officials,
juries or courts. As a result, law is inconsistently and sometimes erroneously applied and the distinctions made by courts between prohibited
and permissible materials often appear indefensible. Errors in the application of the law and uncertainty about its scope also cause interference with the communication of constitutionally protected materials.
Id. at 53.
6 107 S. Ct. 1918 (1987).
7 See id. at 1920 (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)).
8 See id. at 1921.
9 Id. at 1920.
10 Id. at 1929. A sign on one of the stores claimed that it had "The Largest
Selection of Adult Merchandise in Northern Illinois." Id.
II See id. at 1929 n.9. One store had a sign posted describing the premises as an
"Adult Book Store" and requiring that "patrons must be 18 years of age to enter."
People v. Pope, 138 Ill. App. 3d 726, 732, 486 N.E.2d 350, 353 (1985), vacated sub
nom., Pope v. Illinois, 107 S. Ct. 1918 (1987).
12 People v. Morrison, 138 Ill. App. 3d 595, 597, 486 N.E.2d 345, 347 (1985),
vacated sub nom. Pope v. Illinois, 107 S. Ct. 1918 (1987); Pope, 138 Ill. App. 3d at
732, 486 N.E.2d at 353.
13 Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1920. In the case of both purchases the detective positioned the magazines face down on the counter which forced the petitioners to
observe both covers of the magazines containing sexually explicit photographs.
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each petitioner was arrested 14 and later charged with the crime of
"obscenity" for the sale of obscene material.' 5
At trial, defendants Pope and Morrison each filed a motion
to dismiss the charges against them, maintaining that the Illinois
obscenity statute violated the first and fourteenth amendments of
the United States Constitution.16 Both defendants asserted, inter
alia, that the statute should have required the application of an
objective "reasonable person" standard in determining whether
the allegedly obscene materials were "utterly without redeeming
social value."' 7 Lack of such an objective standard, Morrison and
Pope contended, rendered the statute unconstitutional.' 8 The
trial court rejected these arguments and directed the respective
juries to apply "contemporary community standards" in determining the social value question.' 9 Both defendants were subse14 Morrison, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 597, 486 N.E.2d at 347; Pope, 138 Ill. App. 3d at
732, 486 N.E.2d at 353.
15 Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1920. Both petitioners were charged with three counts of
obscenity under the then applicable Illinois obscenity statute. Morrison, 138 Ill.
App. 3d at 597, 486 N.E.2d at 346; Pope, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 731, 486 N.E.2d at 352.
The statute provided in part:
A person commits obscenity when, with the knowledge of the nature or
content thereof, or recklessly failing to exercise reasonable inspection
which would have disclosed the nature or content thereof he .

.

. sells,

delivers, or provides, or offers or agrees to sell, deliver or provide any
obscene writing, picture, record or other representation or embodiment
of the obscene ....
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-20(a)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1979).
16 Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1920.
17 Id. The allegedly invalid Illinois statute incorporated the third component of
the tripartite obscenity test articulated in A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs
of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Mass., 383 U.S. 413 (1966). Id. at
1920 n. 1. The third component of the obscenity test required that the material be
"utterly without redeeming social value." Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 418 (Brennan, J.,
plurality opinion). See infra notes 54-58 (discussing Memoirs). The statute also
called for the application of "contemporary community standards" to the question
of whether the materials were "utterly without redeeming social value." Pope, 107
S. Ct. at 1920.
18 Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1920.
19 d. The jury instruction in the Morrison case stated:
A thing is obscene if considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to
a prurient interest, that is, a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex,
or excretion, and, it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in its description or representation of such matters; for example, by
a patently offensive description or representation of ultimate sexual
acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated, or by a patently offensive
description or representation of masturbation, excretory functions, or
lewd exhibition of the genitals, and, it is utterly without redeeming social value.
In determining whether a thing is obscene, you are to consider how
it would be viewed by ordinary adults in the whole State of Illinois
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quently convicted of obscenity on all counts and each appealed
20
their conviction.
On appeal, the Second District Court of the Illinois Court of
Appeals rejected the appellants' contention that the "reasonable
person" standard applied, and therefore affirmed the convictions. 2 1 The Supreme Court of Illinois denied a subsequent petition for review 22 and the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 23 The United States Supreme Court held that the appropriate standard for determining obscenity requires the trier of
fact, inter alia, to determine whether a reasonable person would
find that the material, taken as a whole, lacks serious "literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value." ' 24 The Supreme Court also
ruled that the obscenity convictions should stand despite an improper jury instruction if a state appellate court concludes that
"no rational juror, if properly instructed, could find value" in the
materials in question.2 5 The Court vacated the decision and remanded the case to the Illinois Court of Appeals for a determina26
tion of the harmless error issue.
The constitutional rights to free speech and freedom of the
press have played an important role in the development of our
society.2 7 Any restrictions of these rights, therefore, are considrather than by the people in any single city or town or region within the
State.
People v. Morrison, 138 Il1. App. 3d 595, 599, 486 N.E.2d 345, 348 (1985), vacated
sub nom. Pope v. Illinois, 107 S. Ct. 1918 (1987).
20 Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1920.
21 Morrison, 138 11. App. 3d at 602, 486 N.E.2d at 350; People v. Pope, 138 Ill.
App. 3d 726, 745, 486 N.E.2d 350, 362 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1985), vacated sub nom. Pope v.
Illinois, 107 S. Ct. 1918 (1987).
22 Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1920.
23 Pope v. Illinois, 107 S. Ct. 61 (1986).
24 Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1921. In support of the reasonable person standard the
Court concluded that "[t]he proper inquiry is not whether an ordinary number of
any given community would find serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value
in allegedly obscene material, but whether a reasonable person would find such
value in the material, taken as a whole." Id. (footnote omitted).
25 Id. at 1922.
26 Id. at 1923.
27 See J. MADISON, REPORT TO THE VIRGINIA HOUSE OF DELEGATES ON THE VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS OF 1798 (1800), in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY
THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, TOGETHER WITH THE JOURNAL
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 571 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES]. The importance of freedom of the press was illustrated in the remark that

"[in every state, probably, in the Union, the press has exerted a freedom in canvassing the merits and measures of public men, of every description which has not
been confined to the strict limits of the common law." Id. at 570.
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ered inherently dangerous. 28 It is thus imperative that the measures developed for judging
obscenity recognize and protect these
9
2
fundamental freedoms.

The English case of Regina v. Hicklin s ° sets forth the early
common law standard for judging obscenity. 3 ' Hicklin enunciated that material was to be judged in terms of its effect on the
most susceptible members of the community. 2 Moreover, the
Hicklin court determined that allegedly obscene material should
be scrutinized by the impact of individual passages and not by the
entire work as a whole.3 3 Initially, several American courts followed this standard, 4 but later decisions rejected Hicklin in favor
of a definition of obscenity which evaluated the effect of the material as a whole on the average person in the community.35 In
28 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973). The Court specifically noted "the
inherent dangers of undertaking to regulate any form of expression" and cautioned
that "[s]tate statutes designed to regulate obscene materials must be carefully limited." Id. at 23-24.
29 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488 (1957). The Court emphasized that:
The fundamental freedoms of speech and press have contributed
greatly to the development and well-being of our free society and are
indispensable to its continued growth. Ceaseless vigilance is the watch-

word to prevent their erosion by Congress or by the States. .

.

. It is

therefore vital that the standards for judging obscenity safeguard the
protection of freedom of speech and press for material which does not
treat sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest.
Id. at 488.
30 3 L.R.-Q.B. 359 (1868).
31 Id.
32 Id. at 369. The court posited that the test of obscenity was "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose
minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of
this sort may fall." Id.
33 See id. at 374.
34 See, e.g., MacFadden v. United States, 165 F. 51, 52 (3d Cir. 1908); United
States v. Clarke, 38 F. 500, 502 (E.D. Mo. 1889); United States v. Bennett, 24 Fed.
Cas. 1093, 1093 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879); Commonwealth v. Buckley, 200 Mass. 346,
347, 86 N.E. 910, 911 (1909).
35 See United States v. One Book C-i'led "Ulysses", 5 F. Supp. 182, 184-85
(S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd sub nom., United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses" by
James Joyce, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934). In One Book Entitled "Ulysses, " customs
officials, pursuant to a federal tariff statute seized an allegedly obscene book written
by James Joyce entitled Ulysses. One Book Entitled "Ulysses, " 72 F.2d at 706 (citation
omitted). Random House Inc. intervened denying that the book was obscene and
contended that the book was therefore illegally seized. Id. The lower court entered
a decree declaring that the book did not violate the federal statute. Id. The court
of appeals affirmed the lower court decision that the book was not obscene,
observing
the proper test of whether a given book is obscene is its dominant effect.
In applying this test, relevancy of the objectionable parts to the theme,
the established reputation of the work in the estimation of approved
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1957, this new standard of obscenity became the law in the
landmark case of Roth v. United States.36
In Roth, the United States Supreme Court, for the first time
in its history, examined the constitutional rimifications of a state
obscenity statute. The Court first concluded that the framers of
the Bill of Rights intended the first amendment to protect the
free interchange of ideas of social and political value. 38 The Roth
Court asserted that by definition obscenity is "utterly without redeeming social importance.

'3 9

The Court therefore held that

obscenity was not protected under the first amendment and as
such could be regulated by the states.40
In Roth, the United States Supreme Court promulgated the
test for obscenity as "whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the
material taken as a whole appeal[ed] to the prurient interest." 4 '
The Court specified further that such material is of the type that
has "a tendency to excite lustful thoughts."4 2 This new definition of obscenity, calling for the application of "contemporary
community standards," marked a clear change in direction from
critics, if the book is modern, and the verdict of the past, if it is ancient,
are persuasive pieces of evidence; for works of art are not likely to sustain a high position with no better warrant for their existence than their
obscene content.
Id. at 708-09.
36 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
37 See F. SCHAUER, THE LAw OF OBSCENITY 30-48 (1976).

The Roth case was

presented under both the California Penal Code and a federal obscenity statute
which prohibited the mailing of obscene material. Roth, 354 U.S. at 479 n.1 (citations omitted).
38 See Roth, 354 U.S. at 484. The Court noted that this objective was made
known as early as 1774 in a letter of the Continental Congress which stated:
The last right we shall mention, regards the freedom of the press.
The importance of this consists, besides the advancement of truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments
on the administration of Government, its ready communication of
thoughts between subjects, and its consequential promotion of union
among them, whereby oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated,
into more honourable and just modes of conducting affairs.
Id. (quoting Letter from Continental Congress to Inhabitatants of Quebec, reprinted
in I JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 108 (1774)).
39 Id. at 484-85.
40 See id.
41 Id. at 489. The Roth Court was the first to use the term "contemporary community standards." F. SCHAUER, supra note 37, at 116-17. This standard was a reformulation of the test used by many lower courts. Id. at 117. The first opinion to
articulate such a test was written by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913). Id. at 117 n.5.
42 Roth, 354 U.S. at 487 n.20.
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the Hick/in standard.43
The Roth Court's new definition of obscenity differed from
the Hicklin standard in two significant respects.4 4 First, the Hicklin standard permitted material to be evaluated "merely by the
effect of an isolated excerpt. ' 45 The Roth standard, however, required that "the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeal to prurient interest."'46 Second, the Hicklin standard was
based on whether the most susceptible persons in a community
would find that a material was obscene. 47 The Roth standard, on
the other hand, required the trier of fact to determine "whether
to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appealed to prurient interest.

' 48

The Roth Court reasoned that the

standard promulgated in Hicklin could result in the suppression
of artistic and aesthetic sexual material, and therefore rejected
that standard as placing undue constraints on the constitutionally
protected rights of free speech and press. 49 The Court further
stated that the new standard would adequately protect legitimate
material against a constitutional assault based on the first
amendment.5 °
Although it held that obscenity was not a constitutionally
protected form of expression, the Roth Court disavowed that its
holding would open the door to censorship. 5 ' Support for the
fundamental first amendment values of free speech and freedom
of the press was emphasized by the Court's warning that "ceaseless vigilance" would be required to forestall the deterioration of
these fundamental freedoms "by Congress or by the States." 52
The Court added that "[t]he door barring federal and state intrusion into this area cannot be left ajar; it must be kept tightly
closed and opened only the slightest crack necessary to prevent
43 See Curtis, Obscenity: The Justices' (Not So) New Robes, 8 CAMPBELL L. REV. 387,
391 (1986).
44 See Roth, 354 U.S. at 488-89. See also Curtis, supra note 43, at 391.
45 Roth, 354 U.S. at 488-89 (citing Regina v. Hicklin, 3 L.R.-QB. 360 (1868)).
46 See id. at 489.
47 See Hicklin, 3 L.R.- QB. at 369. See also supra notes 30-35 and accompanying
text (discussing Hicklin standard).
48 Roth, 354 U.S. at 489 (footnote omitted). The Court defined prurient as
"itching; longing; uneasy with desire or longing; of persons, having itching, morbid, or lascivious longing; of desire, curiosity, or propensity, lewd." Id. at 487 n.20
(citation omitted).
49 Id. at 489.
50 Id.
51 See id. at 488.
52 Roth, 354 U.S. at 488. See also supra note 29.
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Nine years later, in A Book Named 'John Cleland's Memoirs of a
Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Massachusetts,54 the Court
reaffirmed its conviction to the first amendment values of free
speech and freedom of the press. 55 Extrapolating from the Roth

Court's characterization of obscene materials as "utterly without
redeeming social importance,

' 56

the Court formulated a new

three prong test for judging obscenity. 57 Obscene material was
(1) "utterly without redeeming social value," (2) "appeal[ed] to
a prurient interest in sex," (3) was "patently offensive because it
affront[ed] contemporary community standards relating to the
description of sexual matters. "58
The creation of a new definition of obscenity by a plurality of
the Memoirs Court reflected the lack of consensus over how to
delineate obscenity from other forms of speech.59 From 1957 to
1966, the Court's efforts to agree upon a definition of obscenity
failed.6" The Court started a policy of summarily reversing obscenity judgments because of an inability to agree on a single obscenity standard. 6 ' Between 1967 and 1973, the Supreme Court
53

Id.

54 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
55 See id. at 417 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). In Memoirs, the Attorney General for Massachusetts tried to have the book Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure, known
as Fanny Hill, declared obscene pursuant to state statute. Id. at 415 (Brennan, J.,
plurality opinion) (citation omitted). The trial court determined that the book was
obscene and as such "not entitled to the protection of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments." Id. at 417 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). The Supreme Court of
Massachusetts subsequently affirmed this conclusion and the United States
Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. Id.
56 Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
57 See Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 418 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
58 Id. See generally United States v. 35mm Motion Picture Film Entitled "Language of Love," 432 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1970) (explaining Memoirs' three prong test).
59 See F. SCHAUER, supra note 37, at 44.
60 See, e.g., Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 480-81 (1966) (Black, J.,
dissenting); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring);
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508-10 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Black commented in Ginzburg on the tremendous amount of confusion surrounding the definition of obscenity: "After the fourteen separate opinions handed
down ... today no person, not even the most learned judge much less a layman, is
capable of knowing in advance of an ultimate decision in his particular case by this
Court whether certain material comes within the area of 'obscenity'..
Ginzburg,
383 U.S. at 480-81 (Black, J., dissenting).
61 See F. SCHAUER, supra note 37, at 44. The divergence of opinions among the
Justices was evidenced by the fact that:
[o]ne year after Memoirs, the Supreme Court agreed to review three state
cases dealing with magazines of predominantly sexual content such as
Lust Pool, Shame Agent, Gent, Modern Man, High Heels and Spree. In a short
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overturned thirty-one obscenity convictions by summary judgment.2 For the first time since Roth, a majority of the Court in
Miller v. Califor ia6 3 agreed upon a set of rules for distinguishing
obscenity from constitutionally protected speech.'"
The Miller Court announced a new definition of obscenity
which was not expected to have the problems of vagueness and
overbreadth associated with prior definitions. 65 The Court formulated a new three part test for obscenity.6 6 The test required
the trier of fact to determine
(1) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeal[ed] to the prurient interest; (2) "whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law;" and (3)
"whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, ar'6 7
tistic, political or scientific value."
The "utterly without redeeming social value standard" promulgated
by the Memoirs Court was replaced with a new standard which required that the material contain meritorious value.6 8
Despite Chief Justice Burger's observation in Miller that the
Court's obscenity definition would overcome problems associated
per curiam opinion, the Court noted the differences in views among its
members as to the proper test for obscenity or scope of obscenity regulation, but the conclusion of the Court was merely an acknowledgment
of their divergence.
Id.
Id.
413 U.S. 15 (1973). The Supreme Court issued decisions in four other obscenity cases the same day that Miller was decided. See United States v. Onto, 413
U.S. 139 (1973) (first amendment does not prohibit federal government from regulating interstate transportation of obscene materials); United States v. Twelve 200Ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973) (first amendment protection
does not prevent federal government from regulating importation of obscene
materials for personal use); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973) (first amendment does not protect sale and distribution of obscene books to consenting adults);
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (first amendment does not prevent states from regulating the display of obscene films in commercial theatres). See
also Note, Community Standards, Class Actions, and Obscenity Under Miller v. California, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1838 n.l (1975).
64 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
65 See id. at 27.
66 Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
67 Id. (citation omitted).
68 See id. at 24-25. In rejecting the Memoirs test the Court stated that "[wie do
not adopt as a constitutional standard the 'utterly without redeeming social value'
test of Memoirs; that concept has never commanded the adherence of more than
three Justices at one time." Id. (footnote omitted).
62
63

1988]

NOTES

487

with prior definitions,6 9 there still remained important unanswered
questions. 70 While the Miller Court posited that "contemporary
community standards" must be applied by triers of fact when determining whether material is obscene, problems arose in the application of such standards. 7 '
An important unanswered question after Miller was whether the
value of allegedly obscene material was to be judged by reference to
community standards. 7 2 The Court has recognized that although
the Miller Court defined value, such value was not discussed in conjunction with contemporary community standards.7 3 It was not until fourteen years after Miller that the United States Supreme Court
fully addressed this issue in Pope v. Illinois. 4
In Pope, the United States Supreme Court expressly rejected the
contention that the trier of fact must refer to contemporary community standards when determining whether an allegedly obscene material lacks serious value. 7 5 Justice White, writing for a majority of
the Court, first noted that the third component of the Miller test requires the fact-finder to determine "whether the work, taken as 76a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."
Accordingly, the Justice posited that the obscenity issue in Pope was
"whether, in a prosecution for the sale of allegedly obscene materials, the jury may be instructed to apply community standards in de69 See id. at 27.
70 See Note, supra note 63, at 1839. "Neither Miller... nor its progeny settle the

fundamental questions of whether government should, as a matter of policy, suppress the distribution of obscenity, and of whether such suppression is consistent
with the first amendment values. Nor have these cases resolved the question of
what obscenity is." Id. (footnotes omitted).
71 See, e.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974); Hamling v. United States,
418 U.S. 87, 103-10 (1974); United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Material,
709 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1983). TheJenkins Court enunciated that the "community"
considered does not have to be a statewide community and it is "constitutionally
permissible to permit juries to rely on [their own] understanding of the community
from which they came" when determining "contemporary community standards."
Id. at 157. The Court asserted that Miller did not mandate that a "statewide" standard of obscenity be used. See Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 157. Various Articles of Obscene
Material highlighted one additional problem inherent in the application of "contemporary community standards." Because "under Miller the trier of fact is at liberty to identify and apply community standards as he sees them," the Court
pronounced that "the trier's finding that the material is non-obscene is virtually
shielded from appellate scrutiny." Id. at 136.
72 See F. SCHAUER, supra note 37, at 122-24.
73 See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 301 (1977) (citing F. SCHAUER, THE
LAw OF OBSCENITY 123-24 (1976)).
74 107 S. Ct. 1918 (1987).
75 See id. at 1921.
76 Id. at 1920 (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 24).

488

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

ciding the value question.

[Vol. 18:478

77

Justice White observed that there was no precedent for Illinois'
contention that the value of allegedly obscene material was to be
determined by reference to community standards. 7' The Justice
then pointed out that "unlike [thej prurient appeal and patent offensiveness" portions of the Miller test, "literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value ...

is not discussed in terms of contemporary com-

munity standards." 79 Justice White asserted that this omission by
the Miller Court was deliberate. s
Concluding his analysis of the obscenity issue, Justice White
recognized that the protection afforded to artistic and aesthetic
works of value by the first amendment is not contingent upon approval by the government or widespread popularity. 8 ' He then remarked that the value of a work, with regard to the first amendment,
does not vary from one community to another.8 2 For this reason,
the Court reasoned that the proper inquiry for a trier of fact is "not
whether an ordinary member of any given community would find
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value in allegedly obscene material, but whether a reasonable person would find such
value in the material, taken as a whole."- 83 Accordingly, the Court
held that the jury instruction at issue was unconstitutional.8 4
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia agreed with the Court's
objective "reasonable person" standard for determining the value
of allegedly obscene material. 85 However, Justice Scalia also concluded that it was virtually impossible to objectively determine what
constitutes literary or artistic value. 86 Therefore, he suggested that
77
78

Id.
Id.

79
80

Id. (quoting Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 301 (1977)).
Id. at 1921.

81 Id. (citing Miller, 413 U.S. at 34).
82

Id.

83

Id. (footnote omitted).

84

Id. The instruction directed the jury to determine obscenity by deciding "how

[the material] would be viewed by ordinary adults in the whole State of Illinois."
Id. at 1920 & n.2. See also supra note 19 and accompanying text.
85
86

Id. at 1923 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. Justice Scalia observed:
Since ratiocination has little to do with esthetics, the fabled "reasonable" man is of little help in the inquiry, and would have to be replaced
with, perhaps, the "man of tolerably good taste"-a description that betrays the lack of an ascertainable standard. If evenhanded and accurate
decisionmaking is not always impossible under such a regime, it is at
least impossible in cases that matter. I think we would be better advised
to adopt as a legal maxim what has long been the wisdom of mankind:
Degustibus non est disputandum. Just as there is no use arguing about taste,
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the Court reexamine Miller.8 7
Justice Blackmun wrote a separate opinion, concurring with the
majority on the obscenity issue. 88 Justice Blackmun rejected Justice

Stevens' dissenting argument that an objective person standard for
determining whether a material lacks serious value would lead to
censorship by the majority of the population.8 9 He reiterated the
Court's position that "even a minority view among reasonable people that a work has value may protect that work from being judged
'obscene.' "90
Justice Brennan, in a dissenting opinion, supported Justice Stevens' argument that "criminalizing the possession or sale of 'obscene' materials to consenting adults" was unconstitutional. 9 He
asserted that the notion of obscenity is nebulous and defies definition.9 2 Consequently, any regulation of allegedly obscene material
could not adequately provide notice to persons dealing with such
matter and would therefore violate their constitutional rights to due
process and free speech.9 3
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall, voiced his disagreement with the majority on the obscenity issue. 94 Justice Stevens
noted that although the first amendment protects the distribution of
magazines, this protection does not extend to obscene material. 95
The Justice then proceeded to question the Court's analysis of the
third element of the Miller test concerning the aesthetic and social
value of a particular material. 9 6
According to Justice Stevens, the third prong of the Miller test
was designed to assure that materials having appeal only to a minority of the population would not be unduly suppressed by obscenity
there is no use litigating about it. For the law courts to decide "What is

Beauty" is a novelty even by today's standards.
Id.

87 Id.
88 Id.

(Blackmun,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Blackmun
joined Part I ofJustice Stevens' dissenting opinion, agreeing that "harmless error"
analysis in this instance is not fitting. Id. For discussion ofJustice Stevens' view on
harmless error analysis, see infra notes 188-99 and accompanying text.

89 See id.at 1923-24 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
90 Id. at 1924. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
91 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92 Id.
93 See id.
94 Id. at 1924 (Stevens,J., dissenting). Justice Brennan joined in with this entire
dissent except for footnote 11. Id. at 1931 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun also joined in Part I of Justice Stevens' dissent. Id.
95 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
96 See id.
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regulations. 9 7 Despite the fact that the Pope majority enunciated an
objective standard for determining the value of a work,9 Justice Stevens expressed concern that the Court's obscenity standard might
fail to protect materials which do not appeal to the majority interest. 9 According to the Justice, a juror instructed to apply a "reasonable person" standard "might well believe that the majority of
the population who find no value" in a particular material "are more
reasonable than the minority who do find value.' 10'
Justice Stevens presented several additional arguments supporting his dissent on the obscenity issue.' ° l Referring to his dissenting opinion in a previous case, Justice Stevens reasserted his
position that the government cannot "constitutionally criminalize"
the sale of obscene material, "absent some connection to minors, or
obtrusive display to unconsenting adults.""' 2 Justice Stevens also
reiterated his position that penal statutes which are vague and overbroad, and criminalize certain classifications of speech, are inherently unconstitutional.'0 3 The Justice concluded by declaring that
because of the great difficulty in agreeing on the value of a material,
"we must rely on the capacity of the free marketplace of ideas to
distinguish that 4which is useful or beautiful from that which is ugly
10
or worthless."'

Since its inception the harmless error rule has had a significant
impact on the criminal appeals process.'0 5 The rule itself stems
from the recognition that some trial errors have such a trivial impact
97 See id. at 1927 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens asserted that "[t]he
purpose of the third element of the Miller test is to ensure that the obscenity laws
not be allowed to 'level the available reading matter to the majority or lowest common denominator of the population.' " Id. (quoting F. SCHAUER, supra note 37, at
144).
98 Id.
99 Id.

100 Id. Justice Stevens observed that the difficulties with the obscenity standard

announced by the Pope Court become more apparent when a "discrete segment of
the population" finds value in a particular material although "the ordinary 'reasonable person' would not." Id. at 1927 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101 See id. at 1927-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102 Id. at 1927 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Smith v. United States, 431 U.S.
291, 320-21 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). The Justice asserted that one of the main
problems with the obscenity standard announced by the majority is its vagueness.
Id. at 1927 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103 Id. at 1928-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Smith v. United States, 431
U.S. 291, 302-03 (1977) (legislation must define what type of conduct is
prohibited).
104 Pope, 107 S.Ct. at 1930 (quoting Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 320-21
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
105 See Goldberg, Harmless Error: ConstitutionalSneak Thief, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 421 (1980).
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on the overall integrity of the trial process that they may be overlooked."0 6 Historically, at common law, automatic reversal of a
judgment was often caused by the slightest of trial errors. 10 7 This
often resulted in a serious miscarriage ofjustice.'° 8 For this reason,
today, all state and the federal government have rules or statutes
which bar the automatic reversal of judgments for any "error or de10 9
fect which does not alter the parties' substantive rights."'
One of the first major cases decided by the United States
Supreme Court involving the harmless error rule was Bollenbach v.
United States.1 o In Bollenbach, the Court reversed a conspiracy conviction that was based on a supplemental jury instruction which included an improper presumption."' l Rejecting the Government's
argument that the improper instruction constituted harmless error,
the Court stated that "the question is not whether guilt may be spelt
out of a record, but whether guilt has been found by a jury according to the procedure and standards appropriate for criminal trials in
the federal courts."' 12
Another major case involving the violation of constitutional
rights and the harmless error rule was Fahy v. Connecticut." 3 Fahy
involved the admission of incriminating evidence at trial which had
been illegally seized." 4 Despite the petitioner's objection, the trial
judge allowed the evidence to be admitted. 1 5 On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors held that the trial court erroneously admitted the evidence but upheld the petitioner's conviction
See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1966).
See Note, Harmful Use of Harmless Error in Criminal Cases, 64 CORNELL L. REV.
538, 540 (1979). The rationale for this rule was that "any other rule would force
appellate courts to usurp the function of the jury." Id. (footnote omitted).
1o8 See id.
109 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22 (citation omitted).
110 326 U.S. 607 (1946).
M'' Id. at 608-09, 613-15. The trial judge charged the jury that:
Possession of stolen property in another State than that in which it was
stolen shortly after the theft raises a presumption that the possessor was
the thief and transported stolen property in interstate commerce, but
that such presumption is subject to explanation and must be considered
with all the testimony in the case.
Id. at 609.
112 Id. at 614.
113 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
114 Id. at 86. In Fahy, two individuals were charged with having painted swastikas
on a synagogue in Norwalk, Connecticut. Id. at 85-86. Without obtaining a search
or arrest warrant, the police entered one individual's garage and seized paint and a
paint brush in violation of the fourth amendment. Id. at 87 (citing Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961)).
115 Id. at 86.
106
107
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on the grounds that the error was harmless." 6 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari" 17 and concluded that the proper
approach for determining the harmlessness of an error was to ascertain "whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence
complained of might have contributed to the conviction.""..8 Applying this analysis, the Court held that the error was harmful and reversed the conviction." 9 Although the Fahy Court established a
rule for deciding whether an error was harmless, the Court left open
the question of whether a violation of a constitutional right could be
deemed harmless.' 20 That question was answered four years later in
Chapman v. California.121

Chapman involved a state constitutional provision 122 which permitted the prosecutor during a criminal trial to comment on the failure of the accused to testify. 12 1 In addition to the prosecutor's
extensive comments during the trial, the trial judge instructed the
jury that it was permissible to draw negative inferences from the defendants' decision not to testify. 124 The defendants were convicted
of first-degree murder, among other crimes, and the case was appealed to the California Supreme Court. 1 25 Although acknowledg116 Id. The court upheld the conviction based on Connecticut's harmless error
statute which provides that a judgment below need not be reversed if the error
"complained of [has] not materially injured the appellant." Id. at 86 n.2 (quoting
CONN. GEN. STAT.

§ 52-265 (1958)).

117 372 U.S. 928 (1963).
118

Fahy, 375 U.S. at 86-87.

119 Id. at 86.

120 See id.
121 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
122 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13. The California Constitution provided in pertinent
part that "in any criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his failure to
explain or to deny by his testimony any evidence or facts in the case against him
may be commented upon by the court and by counsel, and may be considered by
the court or the jury." Id.
123 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 19.
124 Id. The trial judge instructed the jury:
It is a constitutional right of a defendant in a criminal trial that he may
not be compelled to testify. Thus, whether or not he does testify rests
entirely on his own decision. As to any evidence or facts against him
which the defendant can reasonably be expected to deny or explain because of the facts within his knowledge, if he does not testify or if,
though he does testify, he fails to deny or explain such evidence, the
jury may take that failure into consideration as tending to indicate the
truth of such evidence and as indicating that among the inferences that
may be reasonably drawn therefrom those unfavorable to the defendant
are the more probable.
Id. at 19 n.2.
125 See People v. Teale, 63 Cal. 2d 178, 182-83, 404 P.2d 209, 211-12 (1965),
rev'd sub nom., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). The defendants were
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ing that the petitioners' federal constitutional rights had been
26
violatei, the California Supreme Court upheld the conviction.'
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 12 ' and
held that not all constitutional violations mandate the automatic reversal of a trial verdict.'2 8 The Chapman Court reasoned that certain
errors, based on the particular circumstances of the case, are so trivial and insignificant that they may be designated "harmless."

29

Jus-

tice Black, writing for the majority, stated that in order for a
constitutional error to be deemed harmless, a reviewing court "must
be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt." 3 ° The Court also held that certain constitutional rights are
so fundamental to a fair trial that their violation can never constitute
harmless error.' 3 ' These rights included the right to counsel, the
right to an impartial judge, and the right to be free from coerced
confession.

132

Since Chapman, the Court has been reluctant to expand the category of constitutional rights which are exempt from harmless error
analysis. 133 In Sandstrom v. Montana,'3 4 the Supreme Court ad35
dressed the effect of a presumption of malice in ajury instruction. 1
The Court held that a jury instruction that relieved the state of its
duty to prove each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt
was unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment. 13 6 The
Court in Sandstrom specifically left unanswered the issue of whether a
jury's reliance upon a presumption within a jury instruction constituted harmless error. 1 37 This issue was addressed by the Court four
1 38
years later in Connecticut v. Johnson.
also convicted of first degree robbery and simple kidnapping. Id., 404 P.2d at 21112. Defendant Teale was sentenced to death and defendant Chapman to life imprisonment. Id. at 183, 404 P.2d at 212.
126 Id. at 196-98, 404 P.2d at 220-21.

Chapman v. California, 383 U.S. 956 (1966).
Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22.
Id.
Id. at 24. Justice Black explained that "[w]hile appellate courts do not ordinarily have the original task of applying such a test, it is a familiar standard to all
courts and . . . its adoption will provide a more workable standard." Id. (footnote
127

128
129
130

omitted).
131 Id. at 23.
132

Id. at 23 n.8.

133

See Rose v. Clark, 106 S. Ct. 3101, 3106-07 (1986).

134
135

442 U.S. 510 (1979).
Id. at 512.
Id. at 521-23.

136
137

Id. at 526-27. The Court did not address the harmless error issue since it was
not considered by the Montana Supreme Court. Id. at 527.
138

460 U.S. 73 (1983).
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Johnson involved a jury instruction that contained a conclusive
presumption of intent. 139 The Connecticut Supreme Court, relying
on Sandstrom, held that the erroneous malice presumption included
in the jury instruction was unconstitutional.' 4 ' The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 14 1 A plurality of the Court concluded that the jury instruction was erroneous and deprived the respondent of his constitutional right to a fair trial. 14 2 The Court
asserted that such a deprivation was not harmless error. 143 The
Court reasoned that the conclusive presumption in the jury instruction had the effect of enabling the jury to convict the respondent
without having to consider every element of the offense. 144 Justice
Blackmun stated: "There may be rare situations in which the reviewing court can be confident that a Sandstrom error did not play
any role in the jury's verdict ....

Such an exception, regardless of

145
its precise boundaries, does not apply here."'
Justice Powell dissented, with whom Chief Justice Burger, Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor joined. 46 Justice Powell asserted
that the plurality's opinion would effectively establish "an automatic
reversal rule" for all Sandstrom-like errors. 14 7 The Justice rejected
the plurality's argument that a Sandstrom error would inherently ef-

139 Id. at 78 (Blackmun, J., plurality opinion). The jury instruction included a
descrittion of intent as
a question of fact that is solely within your province as jurors. However,
you should be aware of a rule of law that will be helpful to you and that
is that a person's intention may be inferred from his conduct and every
person is conclusively presumed to intend the natural and necessary
consequences of his act.
Id.
140 See Connecticut v. Johnson, 185 Conn. 163, 171, 440 A.2d 858, 863 (1981),

aff'd, 460 U.S. 73 (1983).
141 Connecticut v. Johnson, 455 U.S. 937 (1982).
142

Johnson, 460 U.S. at 87-88 (Blackmun, J., plurality opinion).

143 Id. at 88 (Blackmun, J., plurality opinion).
144 Id. at 85-86 (Blackmun, J., plurality opinion). Justice Blackmun explained:

An erroneous presumption on a disputed element of the crime renders
irrelevant the evidence on the issue because the jury may have relied
upon the presumption rather than upon that evidence. If the jury may
have failed to consider evidence of intent, a reviewing court cannot hold
that the error did not contribute to the verdict.
Id. (footnote omitted).
145 Id. at 87 (Blackmun, J., plurality opinion). For situations where a reviewing
court may find that a Sandstrom error was not a factor in the jury's verdict, see Hearn
v. James, 677 F.2d 841, 843 (11 th Cir. 1982) (erroneous jury instruction creating
presumption of intent harmless when instruction did not apply to crime for which
defendant was found guilty); Washington v. Harris, 650 F. 2d 447, 453-54 (2d Cir.
1981) (Sandstrom error may not be fatal if defendant concedes intent issue).
146 Johnson, 460 U.S. at 90 (Powell, J., dissenting).
147 Id. But see supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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fect a jury's verdict. 4 " Justice Powell urged the Court to adopt an
approach which would assess the impact of the error in light of the
evidence presented. 4 9 He concluded by asserting that since a presumption, unlike a directed verdict, does not completely eliminate
the intent issue from the trier of fact's determination, a reviewing
court should not be prevented from deciding if "the error was
'harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.' "150
Three years after a divided Court decidedJohnson, the reach of
the harmless error rule was expanded to include an erroneous malice instruction in Rose v. Clark. 5 ' Rose involved a Tennessee state
court's jury instruction in a double homicide trial which stated that
"[a]ll homicides are presumed to be malicious in the absence of evidence which would rebut the implied presumption."' 52 Based on
this charge, a jury convicted the defendant of first and second de53
gree murder.'

The conviction was affirmed by the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. 54 The defendant sought and was granted a writ of
habeas corpus by the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Tennessee. 55 The district court held that the trial
court's jury instructions violated the defendant's consitutional right
to have his guilt demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt. 15 6 The
district court further concluded that the violation could not be considered a harmless error since the defendant had contested the intent of the crime at trial.' 57 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
Id. at 96-97 (Powell, J., dissenting).
See id. at 97 (Powell, J., dissenting).
150 Id. (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 24 (1966)).
'15 106 S. Ct. 3101, 3108-09 (1986).
152 Id. at 3104. The actual instruction given to the jury was:
All homicides are presumed to be malicious in the absence of evidence
which would rebut the implied presumption. Thus, if the state has
proven beyond a reasonable.. . doubt that a killing has occurred, then it
is presumed that the killing was done maliciously. But this presumption
may be rebutted by either direct or circumstantial evidence, or by both,
regardless of whether the same be offered by the Defendant, or exists in
the evidence of the state.
Id. (citation omitted).
153 Id.
154 Id. The appellate court rejected the "respondent's argument that the jury
instruction had impermissibly shifted the burden of proof as to malice." Id. (footnote omitted).
155 Clark v. Rose, 611 F. Supp. 294, 302 (M.D. Tenn. 1983), aff'd, 762 F.2d 1006
(6th Cir. 1985), vacated, 106 S. Ct. 3101 (1986).
156 See id. at 299.
157 Id. at 301-02.
148

149
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affirmed,"' 8 and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, limiting its review to the harmless error issue.' 5 9
Justice Powell, writing for the majority,1 60 vacated the judgment
of the court of appeals and remanded the case for an analysis of the
harmless error issue.16 ' The Court held that except in the case
where an error causes a fundamentally unfair trial, a conviction
should be upheld "[w]here a reviewing court can find that the record developed at trial establishes guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt."' 162 In doing so, the Court made it clear that violations that
mandate automatic reversal under Chapman are "the exception and
not the rule."' 165 According to Justice Powell, as long as a defendant
has adequate representation and is judged by an impartial trier of
fact there is a "strong presumption that any ...

errors" that occur

during the trial process "are subject to harmless error analysis."'"
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Marshall and Brennan, dissented.165 Justice Blackmun questioned the majority's reasoning
concerning harmless error analysis and argued that the erroneous
jury instruction in this case was "analytically indistinguishable"
from other errors to which the Court had previously refused to apply the harmless error rule. 16 6 Moreover, the Justice asserted that
the effect of the instruction was to order the jury to return a guilty
verdict.'16 Justice Blackmun posited that this would relieve the jury
of its constitutional duty to determine if the prosecution had fulfilled its burden of proving each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 6 '
Against this background the Court decided the second major
issue in Pope, which concerned the applicability of harmless error
158 Clark v. Rose, 762 F.2d 1006 (6th Cir. 1985), vacated, 106 S. Ct. 3101 (1986).
159 See Rose, 106 S. Ct. at 3105.
160 Id. at 3102-03. Justice Powell was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Rehnquist, White, and O'Connor. Id.
161 Id. at 3109.
162 Id. at 3107.
163 Id. at 3106 (citing United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499, 509 (1983)).
164 Id. at 3107. The Court emphasized that "the Constitution entitles a criminal
defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one." Id. (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall,
106 S.Ct. 1431, 1436 (1986); United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499, 508-09
(1983)).
165 Id. at 3113 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
166 Id. at 3114 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also Connecticut v. Johnson, 460
U.S. 73, 87-88 (1983) (jury instruction containing conclusive presumption of intent
not harmless error); Bollenbach v. United States 326 U.S. 607, 614-15 (1946) (supplemental jury instruction containing improper presumption not harmless error).
167 Rose, 106 S. Ct. at 3114 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
168 Id. at 3115 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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analysis to an erroneous jury instruction on the appropriate standard for judging the value of allegedly obscene material. 16 9 The
Pope Court held that an erroneous jury instruction regarding the
proper obscenity standard in evaluating the worth of allegedly obscene material could constitute harmless error.' 71 Justice White,
writing for a majority of the Court, rejected the petitioners' contention that their convictions required automatic reversal because of
the unconstitutionality of the Illinois obscenity statute. 17 1 In denying the request to invalidate the obscenity statute and reverse the
petitioners' convictions, Justice White argued that a reversal would
be futile because the law under which the petitioners were convicted
has since been repealed and replaced with a new statute. 172 The
new statute clearly gave the petitioners adequate notice that the sale
of obscene magazines was illegal and prosecution was thereforejustified under this new statute.' 73 The Court reasoned that a retrial
was unnecessary if a reviewing court could conclude "beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury's1 74verdict in this case was not affected by
the erroneous instruction."'
Justice White then noted the similarity between Pope and
Rose. 1 75 Justice White drew an analogy between Rose, where the
Court found that an improper jury instruction on the element of
intent was subject to harmless error analysis, and the erroneous instruction in Pope.1 76 The Justice explained that the erroneous instruction in Rose did not prevent the trier of fact from considering
169 See Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1921.
170 See id. at 1922-23.
171 See id. at 1921.
172 Id. Justice White observed that "the statute under which petitioners were
convicted [was] no longer on the books; it has been repealed and replaced by a
statute that does not call for the application of community standards to the value
question." Id. (footnote omitted).
173 Id. The new statute defines obscenity as:
Any material or performance if (1) the average person, applying contemporary adult community standards, would find that, taken as a
whole, it appeals to the prurient interest; and (2) the average person,
applying contemporary adult community standards, would find that it
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, ultimate sexual acts or
sadomasochistic sexual acts, whether normal or perverted, actual or
simulated, or masturbation, excretory functions or lewd exhibition of
the genitals; and (3) taken as a whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 11-20(b) (1987). Unlike the previous statute, the
amended statute addressed each of the three prongs of the Miller test. See Pope, 107
S. Ct. at 1921 n.4.
174 Id. at 1922. See supra notes 151-68 and accompanying text (discussing Rose).
175 See id.
176 See id.
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the malice question. 177 Similarly, Justice White asserted that the
jury in Pope was not prevented from addressing the issue of whether
the magazines lacked serious value. 7 8 The majority concluded that
because the jury was given an opportunity to find each element of
obscenity beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial court's instructional
error did not "render the trial fundamentally unfair" and therefore
was subject to harmless error analysis. 1 79 The Court determined
that despite the trial court's erroneous instruction, the petitioners'
convictions should not be reversed if on remand the appellate court
determines that "no rational juror, if properly instructed, could find
value in the magazines."' 80
Justice Scalia, in a brief concurring opinion, joined the Court in
its analysis of the harmless error issue. 18 1 He expressed the unlikelihood that a "community standard" instruction would lead a jury to
convict, where a "reasonable person" instruction would not.' 8 2 The
Justice reasoned that it was permissible for a reviewing court to ap183
ply the harmless error rule in this particular case.
Justice Blackmun wrote a brief dissent on the harmless error
issue. 18 4 He agreed with Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion on this
question. 18 5 Justice Blackmun stated that harmless error analysis
was not appropriate in this case. 18 6 Writing a separate dissenting
opinion, Justice Brennan did not address the harmless error issue,
but instead agreed with Justice Stevens in attacking the constitutionality of criminally penalizing the "possession or sale of 'obscene'
materials to consenting adults." 187
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall, disagreed with the
Court's treatment of the harmless error issue.' 8 8 Justice Stevens
noted that the law requires the state in a criminal prosecution to
prove each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.189 In an
obscenity trial, the Justice observed, all three elements of the Miller
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 See
180 Id.

id.
at 1922 (footnote omitted). The Court remarked that although it had the
authority to determine whether a constitutional error was harmless, the Court exer-

cises such authority sparingly. Id. at 1922-23.
181 Id. at 1923 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
182

Id.

183
184
185
186

Id.

189

Id.

Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
Id.
187 Id. at 1924 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
188 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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standard must be clearly established.' 90 Since the trial courts in
Pope had given improper instructions on the "value" element, the
Justice reasoned that the juries did not find each of the three elements of obscenity necessary to convict the petitioners.' 9 ' This type
of error, asserted Justice Stevens, can never be deemed harmless
since it flagrantly violates the petitioner's constitutional right to a
jury trial on "all elements of the offense with which he is
charged."' 9 2 Justice Stevens acknowledged that harmless error
analysis may be suitable when an error does not impinge upon the
trier of fact's ultimate determination of guilt or innocence.1 93 He
further emphasized that harmless error analysis can be used to protect a jury's findings, but not to supplement them.' 9 4 Accordingly,
the Justice reasoned that such an analysis may not be utilized by a
court to answer a question which must be decided by a jury.' 95
Concluding his analysis of the harmless error issue, Justice Stevens emphatically disagreed with the Pope Court over the
seriousness of the instructional error. 196 Justice Stevens distinguished the error in Pope from that in Rose.' 9 7 TheJustice observed
that in certain cases like Rose, where there is an abundance of evidence of intent, the use of a presumption in a jury instruction may
However, in Pope, the Justice asbe considered "superfluous."' 9'
serted that a court could never find that the error was merely superfluous, because the effect of the erroneous instruction was to
preclude the jury from considering an essential element of the
crime. 9' 9
Despite the Court's intensive examination of both the obscenity
and the harmless error issues, the Pope decision leaves a number of
unanswered questions. Commencing with the obscenity issue, the
190 Id. The Justice explained that in a criminal prosecution of the sale or possession of obscene material the prosecutor must prove each element of the Miller test

beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. See also supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text
(discussing Miller).
191 Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1924-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
192 Id. at 1925 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S.

637, 650 (1976) (White, J., concurring)).
193
194
195

Id.
Id.
Id. Justice Stevens specifically observed that "[i]t is fundamental that an ap-

pellate court (and for that matter, a trial court) is not free to decide in a criminal
case that, if asked, a jury would have found something that it did not find." Id.
196 See id. at 1926 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
19 7 See id.
198 Id. See also Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 95 n.3 (1983) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
'99 Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1926 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Pope decision exemplifies what Justice Harlan once called, "the intractable obscenity problem." 0 Despite the majority's gallant effort to clarify the existing test for obscenity, the truth of the matter
is that the existing obscenity standard is neither less vague nor more
definable than the standards of the past.2 0 ' Justice Brennan once
remarked with respect to obscenity that "[t]he problem is . . .that
one cannot say with certainty that material is obscene until at least
five members of this Court, applying inevitably obscure standards,
have pronounced it so." 2 0° 2 More recently, Justice Scalia expressed
this precise sentiment by recognizing the extreme difficulty in determining literary or artistic worth on an objective basis.20 3 Statements
like these illuminate the seriousness of the vagueness problem. As
Justice Stevens observed, "[t]he Constitution cannot tolerate
schemes that criminalize categories of speech that the Court has
conceded to be so vague and uncertain that they cannot 'be defined
legislatively.' "204
The uncertainty that surrounds what constitutes "obscenity" is
a formidable problem.20 5 Vague obscenity statutes fail to provide
adequate notice to alert a person that they may be in danger of criminal prosecution.2 "6 The Pope majority reasoned that the petitioners
"could not plausibly claim that the repealed statute failed to give
them notice" that they would be subject to prosecution for the sale
of obscene materials.2 "7 The majority's reasoning is flawed because
although the petitioners realized the magazines were "pornographic," they might not have known that the magazines were legally "obscene.120 8 Despite this consideration, however, the
majority would subject the petitioners to criminal prosecution.20 9
Legislation that more specifically defines the types of materials that
are deemed legally obscene must be enacted to alleviate the vague200 Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (Harlan,J., concur-

ring in part and dissenting in part).
201 See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); A Book Named "John
Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Mass., 383 U.S.
413 (1966); Roth v. United States 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Regina v. Hicklin, 3 L.R.Q.B. 359 (1868). See also F. SCHAUER, supra note 37, at 57.
202 Paris Adult Theatre

I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 92 (1973)

(Brennan, J.,

dissenting).
203 Pope, 107 S.Ct. at 1923 (Scalia, J., concurring).
204 Id. at 1929-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Smith v. United States, 431
U.S. 291, 303 (1977)).
205 See Note, supra note 63, at 1847-52.
206 See Pope, 107 S.Ct. at 1928-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
207 Id. at 1921.
208 See id. at 1929 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
209 Id. at 1921.
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ness of the obscenity definition. Moreover, the utilization of criminal prosecution as the means for controlling the possession and sale
of obscene material must be seriously questioned. 2 '0 A declaratory
judgment procedure which utilizes the civil process, as opposed to
criminal prosecution,21 would appear to strike a more balanced approach between the states' interest in morality and the first
amendment.
The Pope Court's interpretation of the third prong of the Miller
test is a small step in the right direction. As Justice White observed,
the value of a work does not vary from one community to another,
as far as the first amendment is concerned. 2 By substituting an
objective "reasonable person" standard for the trial court's "community standards" approach, the Court adopted a seemingly less
confusing approach for deciding whether a material lacks serious
value. 2 13 Whether application of the reasonable person standard is
less subjective than the "community standards" approach remains
to be seen. AsJustice Stevens observed in Smith, "[in the final analysis, the guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant in an obscenity
trial is determined primarily by individual jurors' subjective reactions to the materials in question rather than by the predictable application of rules of law." ' 2 14 Since obscenity is such a subjective
concept, it is likely that the Court will need to revisit the Miller test
in the future.
The Court's ruling on the harmless error issue also leaves several issues unresolved. The first major issue that requires attention
is where to draw the line between constitutional rights which are "so
basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be deemed harmless ' 21 5 and constitutional rights which are not so basic to a fair
trial. Since Chapman, it has generally been recognized that all constitutional violations do not necessitate the automatic reversal of a
conviction.21 6 However, to designate a constitutional error as
harmless, a reviewing court must find that the error "was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. '21
Although the Pope Court found that
an erroneous jury instruction concerning application of the approSee Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 313 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY, supra note 5, at 63.
212 Pope, 107 S.Ct. at 1921.
213 See Wilcox, The Craft of Drafting Plain-LanguageJury Instructions: A Study of the
Sample Pattern Instruction on Obscenity, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 1159, 1169-70 (1986).
214 Smith, 431 U.S. at 316 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
215 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 (footnote omitted).
216 Id.
217 Id. at 24.
210
211

502

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 18:478

priate obscenity,standard was subject to harmless error review, 2 8
the Court refrained from articulating a coherent standard for determining when an infringement of a defendant's constitutional right
during a criminal prosecution may constitute "harmless error." It is
imperative that the Court promulgate such a standard in order to
provide reviewing courts with clear-cut guidelines for addressing
this important issue.
The majority's ruling also leaves open the question of how far
an appellate or trial court may go in resolving issues which have
been traditionally and exclusively reserved for determination by the
jury. The Court held that despite the trial court's improper jury instruction, "if a reviewing court concludes that no rational juror, if
properly instructed, could find value in the magazines, the convictions should stand." ' 21 9 It appears that the Court is granting appellate courts the authority to "constitutionally supplement" the
findings of the jury. 220 Although the Court in Rose held that the
harmless error standard may be applied to jury instructions concerning elements of a crime and standards of proof,22 ' an appellate
court does not have unbridled discretion in a criminal trial to determine what a jury would have decided with a different instruction. 2
As Justice Blackmun noted in Rose, "[a] trial that was fundamentally
unfair at the time it took place, because the jury was not compelled
to perform its constitutionally required role, cannot be rendered
fundamentally fair in retrospect by what amounts to nothing more
than an appellate review of the sufficiency of the eyidence. "223 It
has been noted that "the greatest cost of the harmless constitutional
error rule is its usurpation of the jury function. "224
No analysis of a harmless error decision in a criminal prosecution would be complete without a discussion of the sixth amendment. The sixth amendment guarantees all criminal defendants
"the right to a . . . trial, by an impartial jury. ' 225 As Justice Blackmun stated in Rose, each criminal defendant is guaranteed the right
"to have a jury of his peers determine whether . . . [guilt] has been
See Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1922.
Id. The Court did not decide the harmless error issue although it noted that it
did have the authority to do so. Id. at 1922-23. Instead, the Court remanded the
case to the Illinois Court of Appeals for resolution of the harmless error issue. Id.
at 1923.
220 See id. at 1925 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
221 See Rose v. Clark, 106 S. Ct. 3101, 3108-09 (1986).
222 See Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1925.
223 Rose, 106 S.Ct. at 3113 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
224 See Goldberg, supra note 105, at 430.
225 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
218
219
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proven beyond a reasonable doubt."2'2 6 Although the Pope decision
indicates a respectful degree of sensitivity to the defendant's sixth
amendment rights, a question still remains as to how far the Court is
willing to intrude upon these rights. For now suffice it to say that
there appears to be a gradual trend toward the erosion of a criminal
defendant's sixth amendment rights.2 2 7
The Pope decision illuminates the problematic nature of both
the modern-day obscenity standard and the harmless error doctrine.
Despite the majority's noble effort to elucidate the constitutional
definition of obscenity,2 2 8 there remains a need for a clear and understandable definition of obscenity that provides sufficient notice
to those who may be in danger of criminal prosecution. Legislators
and courts must recognize the inherent dangers associated with regulating free expression. The first amendment commands that the
right of free speech must not be abridged.22 9 Courts must also acknowledge the potentially catastrophic consequences of the harmless error doctrine. Reviewing courts must not be permitted to
intrude upon a jury's constitutionally mandated function. To so
permit, would be to fracture the foundation of the sixth amendment.
DavidJ.Paulin
226 Rose, 106 S. Ct. at 3113 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
227 See, e.g., Pope v. Illinois, 107 S. Ct. 1918 (1987); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 106
S. Ct. 1431 (1986); Rose v. Clark, 106 S. Ct. 3101 (1986).
228 See Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1924 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
229 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.

